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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
COMPENSATION FOR HIGHWAY EASEMENTS
OVER SCHOOL TRUST LANDS
The western territories of the United States were admitted to state-
hood by congressional enabling acts which specified that four sections
of every township1 be held in trust by the respective states for support
of public schools.2 Each of these enabling acts contains similar pro-
cedures for disposition of the trust lands3 and requires that the result-
ing revenues be held in trust subject to the same restrictions that apply
to the land.4 Trust lands comprise a large area in each of the western
states.5 Prior to the principal case the state courts were divided on the
'The enabling acts grant sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 of every township, or lands in lieu
thereof, to the state to be held in trust. Sections 16 and 36 were granted to the
Arizona Territory for the support of public schools. Ch. 44, § 15, 9 Stat. 457 (1856),
ch. 56, § 2, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). These two sections were reconfirmed to the state,
and sections 2 and 32 granted for the same purpose by the New Mexico-Arizona En-
abling Act. Ch. 310, § 24, 36 Stat. 572 (1910).
'Arizona's Enabling Act, ch. 310, §28, 36 Stat. 574 (1910), establishing the trust
and its governing restrictions, provides:
See. 28. That it is hereby declared that all lands hereby granted, including those
which, having been heretofore granted to said Territory, are hereby expressly
transferred and confirmed to the said State, shall be by the said State held in trust,
to be disposed of in whole or in part only in manner as herein provided and for
the several objects specified in the respective granting and confirmatory provi-
sions, and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall
be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same.
Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or
indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than for such particular lands,
or the lands from which such money or thing of value shall have been derived,
were granted or confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this
Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.
... Said lands shall not be sold or leased, in whole or in part except to the bidder
at a public auction ...notice of which public auction shall first have been duly
given by advertisement.
'The required procedures of four of the western states have been amended by
Congress. See note 23 infra.
'Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 574 (1910) ; Idaho Admission Act,
ch. 656, § 5, 26 Stat. 216 (1890) ; Montana Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 679(1889) ; Nebraska Enabling Act, ch. 59, § 12, 13 Stat. 49 (1864); New Mexico
Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 10, 36 Stat. 563 (1910) ; North Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180,
§ 11, 25 Stat. 679 (1889) ; Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 9, 34 Stat. 274 (1906) ;
South Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 679 (1889) ; Utah Enabling Act,
ch. 138, § 10, 28 Stat. 110 (1894); Washington Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat.
679 (1889); Wyoming Admission Act, ch. 664, § 5, 26 Stat. 223 (1890).
Compare Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (granting all lands to that
state free of any trust provisions).
' State Total Land Area School Lands Granted Percent of State
Arizona 72,688,000 acres 8,093,156 acres 11.1%
Montana 93,271,040 " 5,198,258 " 5.6%
Nebraska 49,031,680 " 2,730,951 " 5.6%
New Mexico 77,766,400 " 8,711,324 " 11.2%
N. Dakota 44,452,480 " 2,495,396 5.6%
S. Dakota 48,881,920 " 2,733,084 " 5.6%
Utah 52,696,960 " 5,844,196 11.1%
Washington 42,693,760 " 2,376,391 " 5.6%
Wyoming 62,343,040 ' 3,470,009 " 5.6%
BuRmAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, PUBLiC LAND STATISTXCS-1965 3, 7
(1965).
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proper procedures for acquisition and compensation for public highway
easements over these lands. 6 The principal case marked the first
resolution of these questions by the United States Supreme Court.
The Arizona Land Commissioner gave notice of a proposed rule7 to
require compensation for highway right-of-way easements over school
lands held in trust by the state pursuant to the New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling Act." The Arizona Highway Department filed an original
proceeding in the Arizona Supreme Court to prohibit the Land Com-
missioner from enforcing the proposed rule. Issuing a writ of prohibi-
tion, the court held it was the duty of the Land Commissioner to grant
state highway right-of-way easements over school lands without com-
pensation to the trust, because highways so enhance the value of the
remaining school lands as to offset the value of land taken.' On writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court, judgment was reversed and the
case remanded. Held: The procedural restrictions of the Enabling
Act governing disposition of trust lands are inapplicable to state ac-
quisition of highway easements, but the state, by proceedings in the
nature of eminent domain, must compensate the trust for the full ap-
praised value of the land taken. Lassen v. Arizona, 87 Sup. Ct. 584
(1967).
0Requiring Compensation: State ex rel. Galen v. District Court, 42 Mont. 105,112 Pac. 706 (1910); State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 154 Neb.
244, 47 N.W.2d 520 (1951); State ex rel. Johnson v. Central Neb. Pub. Power &
Irrigation Dist., 143 Neb. 153, 8 N.W.2d 841 (1943); State Highway Comm'n v.
Walker, 61 N.M. 374, 301 P.2d 317 (1956) ; State Highway Comm'n v. State, 70 N.D.
673, 297 N.W. 194 (1941).
Not Requiring Compensation: State ex rel Arizona Highway Dep't v. Lassen,
99 Ariz. 161, 407 P.2d 747 (1965) ; Ross v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyo., 30 Wyo. 433,
222 Pac. 3 (1924), aff'd on rehearing, 31 Wyo. 464, 228 Pac. 642 (1925).
Despite the holding of Ross v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyo., supra, that compensation
is not required for easements over trust lands, that case has been construed to apply
only to county rights-of-way, and the practice now followed in Wyoming is that
payment of compensation to the Wyoming State Board of Land is required. See
Brief of the States of Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, Lassen v. Arizona, 87
Sup. Ct. 584 (1967). It would appear that Arizona was the only state which, byjudicial decision and actual practice, did not require compensation for state acquisi-
tion of easements over trust lands.
Washington practice requires compensation for the acquisition of easements
through proceedings in eminent domain. See note 23 and accompanying text, infra.
Proposed Rule No. 12 of the State Land Department:
State and County highway rights-of-way and material sites may be granted by
the Department for an indefinite period for so long as used for the purpose granted
after full payment of the appraised value of the right-of-way or material site has
been made to the State Land Department. The appraised value of the right-of-way
or material site shall be determined in accordance with the principles established
in A.R.S. 12-1122.
Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
State ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't v. Lassen, 99 Ariz. 161, 407 P.2d 747(1965).
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Noting that the United States has a continuing interest in the trust,10
the Court defined the two issues before it as: (1) whether Arizona
could acquire highway easements over trust land without first satis-
fying the Enabling Act's procedural restrictions," and (2) if so, what
measure of compensation must Arizona employ to recompense the
trust for the land taken? The Court, after considering the legislative
history of Arizona's Enabling Act,"2 found that the disposition proce-
dures "were material only so far as necessary to assure that the trust
sought and obtained appropriate compensation."' 3 The Court reasoned
that there was no need to impose such restrictions upon the state as
the abuses at which they had been originally directed 4 were no longer
likely to occur. Demonstrating that state adherence to the procedural
restrictions would be either empty formality or circuitous, the Court
concluded that the restrictions did not apply to state acquisition of
trust land. In resolving the question of the proper measure of com-
pensation, the Court rejected the Arizona court's holding that non-
compensation was justified by the conclusive presumption that high-
ways so enhance remaining trust lands as to offset the value of the land
taken. 5 The Court also expressly rejected the argument of the United
States that, while the state should pay full appraised value for trust
land taken, a reduction in payment should be allowed to the extent the
state proved enhancement in value to the remaining lands. 6 Reason-
ing that the provisions of the Enabling Act were intended to insure
maximum support for the trust, the Court concluded that the proper
measure of compensation to the trust was the full appraised value of
"' New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 574 (1910), provides:
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to prosecute, in
the name of the United States and in its courts, such proceedings at law or in
equity as may from time to time be necessary and appropriate to enforce the
provisions hereof relative to the application and disposition of the said lands
and the products thereof and the funds derived therefrom.
n Supra note 2.
S. REp. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1910) ; Remarks of Senator Beveridge,
45 CoNG. REc. 8227 (1910).
1 87 Sup. Ct. at 587.
" The abuses to which the Court adverted were the unauthorized leases of timber
lands granted to the New Mexico Territory for support of common schools and
colleges. The violations and breaches of trust by the territorial authorities were the
basis of suits, prosecuted by the Department of Justice, known as the "tall timber"
cases. See S. REP. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1910).
' The Supreme Court interpreted the holding of the Arizona court to be that
enhancement of value of the remaining trust lands would be "conclusively presumed."
87 Sup. Ct. at 588. However, the Arizona court based its decision on judicial notice
of such enhancement, stating, 407 P.2d at 750: "It is well known that good highways
throughout a state increase the value of the lands."
" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 17, Lassen v. Arizona, 87
Sup. Ct. 584 (1967).
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lands taken, and that, because the act's enumeration of purposes for
which the trust funds may be used was exclusive, there could be no
diversion of funds due the trust to serve other purposes.
The result in the principal case is commendable in many respects.
Reflecting an appreciation of the importance to the western states and
the United States of the questions involved, the Court not only fully
resolved the controversy before it,8 but also set forth general princi-
ples applicable to states operating under other enabling acts. The
Court, with this decision, established the broad principle that the
procedural restrictions of state enabling acts are inapplicable to state
acquisition of trust land for public uses, providing compensation is
made to the trust for the full appraised value of land taken. By so
doing, not only did the Court resolve the division among state courts, 9
but it established precedent applicable to pending 0 and future litiga-
tion involving state acquisition and use of trust lands. Substantively,
the Court's decision constituted approval of a manageable procedure,
safeguarded by the requirement of full compensation, in the admini-
stration and disposition of trust land. However, despite the commend-
able result reached by the Court, its reasoning requires critical analy-
sis.
The Court recognized that the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act's
procedural restrictions were intended to prevent depletion of the trust
by corrupt administration, yet it denied the present applicability of
these restrictions because of the unlikelihood of recurrence of such
abuses. Conceding the absence of recent public land scandals affecting
trust lands, the Court effectively amended the act by exempting the
state from provisions originally intended to apply primarily to it.2 1
11 Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the realization that funds otherwise due
the trust would, under either the holding of the Arizona court or the argument of
the United States, be diverted for highway construction.
" The United States argued that, because the Arizona court had not reached the
question of the proper standard of compensation, the Court should limit its decision
to the applicability of the procedural restrictions, and defer the compensation
question. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 17, Lassen v.
Arizona, 87 Sup. Ct. 584 (1967). The Court expressly rejected this argument,
holding that full adjudication required determination of the proper compensation
measure for state acquisition of trust lands. 87 Sup. Ct. at 588.
"See cases cited note 6 supra.
-' The decision in the principal case is applicable to two cases now pending in
the State of Washington: Cole v. Odegarrd, Cause No. 39133, Washington Supreme
Court; and United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, Civil Cause No. 2619, United
States District Court, E.D. Wash.
- Congressional consideration of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act took
place during pendency of the "tall timber" cases, in which the justice Department
was prosecuting territorial authorities of New Mexico for exploitation and unauthor-
ized use of timber on school trust lands. The legislative history of the act documents
1967]
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It is significant that Arizona previously had sought Congressional
relief from the procedural restrictions of its Enabling Act, and Con-
gress had denied such relief.21 Where Congress has imposed restric-
tions intended to limit state action, the Court's reasoning is subject
to legitimate criticism when, recognizing such Congressional intent, it
denies applicability of the legislation on the ground of improbable re-
currence of the evil toward which the legislation was directed.
The Court's refusal to require the empty formality and circuity
demanded by the act's procedural restrictions is more persuasive. Its
observations that the state is the only builder of public highways and
possesses powers of eminent domain which it could exercise were it
out-bid at a public auction cannot be denied. It is a needless formality
to require notice and public auction for the disposition of a highway
easement if the only participant is the state highway commissioner.
Even assuming that another party participated and offered the winning
bid, the state would need only bring proceedings in eminent domain to
acquire the easement.
The Court, rather than judicially amending application of the En-
abling Act's procedural restrictions, could have based its decision
upon the practice of other western states under similar enabling acts,
and the import of Congressional amendments to those acts. Congress
has amended the enabling acts of four western states to authorize
acquisition of easements over trust lands through eminent domain pro-
ceedings. 3 Prior to these amendments, the majority of those states
had concluded that, notwithstanding the absence of express provision
for disposition of public easements, the states had an inherent power
to acquire easements over trust land through eminent domain.24 The
an awareness by Congress of these cases, and its attempts to include within the act
restrictions, applicable to the states, to prevent future exploitation and abuse of the
trust. See S. REP. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1910); Remarks of Senator
Beveridge, 45 CONG. REc. 8227 (1910). See generally Murphy v. State, 54 Ariz. 338,
181 P.2d 336 (1947).
'For a full discussion of Arizona's unsuccessful attempts to obtain Congressional
amendment of its Enabling Act's procedural restrictions, see Udall, Arizona's Public
Lands-Mixed Blessing, Mixed Burden, 8 ARiz. L. Rzv. 11, 13 (1966).
Congress adopted general amendments to the enabling acts of the states of North
Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington. Ch. 61, 42 Stat. 158 (1921);
Ch. 172, 47 Stat. 151 (1932).
"Washington has denied that the restrictions of its enabling act limited the
state's power of eminent domain in acquiring easements over trust lands. Tacoma
v. State, 121 Wash. 448, 209 Pac. 700 (1922); Roberts v. Seattle, 63 Wash. 573,
116 Pac. 25 (1911). The Washington holdings were consistent with that of Idaho.
See Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho 8, 71 Pac. 541 (1903). Of the four states whose
enabling acts were amended, only Montana held that Congress had intended to divest
the state of its power of eminent domain over trust lands. State ex rel. Galen v.
District Court, 42 Mont. 105, 112 Pac. 706 (1910).
[ VOL. 42 : 903
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primary purpose and effect of these amendments was to confirm the
earlier holdings of the state courts, manifesting Congressional ap-
proval of a state's freedom to acquire trust lands for public use by
proceedings in eminent domain without violating the procedural re-
strictions of the enabling acts. Rather than indulging in judicial legis-
lation, had the Court adopted this reasoning in combination with its
demonstration of unnecessary formality and circuity, its resolution of
the procedural question would have had a sounder basis.
Resolving the issue of proper compensation, the Court held that the
state was "unequivocally" bound by the Enabling Act to pay the trust
full appraised value for the land taken.2" Although the Court might
be criticized for inconsistency in denying applicability of the proce-
dural restrictions to the state while holding it bound by the compensa-
tion requirement of the same act, the better analysis would be that
strict enforcement of the act's compensation requirement is a necessary
corollary to resolution of the procedural question. By liberalizing the
procedural restrictions upon the state, the Court allowed broad state
discretion in methods of acquisition. To check potential misuse of
this discretion, however, the Court required that the state unqualifiedly
adhere to the requirement of compensation at full appraised value.
Implicit in the Court's reasoning is the theory that, of the two methods
of safeguarding the trust, the procedural restrictions apply only to
acquisition of trust lands by private parties, while the compensation
requirement applies to all acquisitions of trust lands. Consistent with
this theory, the Court concluded that the sole provision of the Enabling
Act applicable to state acquisition of trust land was compensation at
full appraised value.
The Court's determination that the compensation requirement
should be the controlling trust safeguard in state acquisition neces-
sarily required rejection of both the holding of the Arizona court20
and the position taken by the United States.27 The Court correctly
reasoned that this single remaining restriction could not be qualified
without jeopardizing the trust. It is significant that enhancement of
value or general benefits accruing to private land not abutting that
taken by eminent domain have not been allowed to qualify or dim-
inish a condemnation award.2" Although one writer characterizes di-
87 Sup. Ct. at 588.
.- See text accompanying note 9 supra.
See text accompanying note 16 supra.
3 NICHOLS, EmiNrr DomAxi § 8.6205 (rev. 3d ed. 1965).
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minution of compensation because of general enhancement as a "vi-
cious circle, 29 the primary reason for disallowing this basis of re-
duced compensation is its uncertain and speculative measurement."
The value by which a particular tract of land, whether it be publicly
or privately owned, will be enhanced by future construction of a high-
way is indeed speculative. In the case of trust lands dispersed through-
out a state, the value by which they collectively will be enhanced by a
future highway is purely conjectural.31
The Court not only sought to insure that the trust receive a proper
measure of compensation, but also that funds due the trust would not
be diverted to other uses under the guise of a diminution of the con-
demnation award. In Ervien v. United States,3 2 the Court, invalidating
a New Mexico statute authorizing expenditure of trust funds for
publicity designed to promote the state's resources, stated that the
Enabling Act contained "a specific enumeration of the purposes for
which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily ex-
clusive of any other purpose.13 3 It might be argued that the public
benefit served by safe modern highways justifies the comparatively
minor encroachment upon the trust (in the form of diminished con-
demnation awards) or, more pragmatically, that payment for highway
easements would only amount to taking funds from one state "pocket"
and putting them into another.34 Neither contention, however, justifies
disregard of the Enabling Act's requirement of full compensation or
its exclusive enumeration of purposes for which the trust funds may
be used. The legislative history of the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling
Act in particular, and the enabling acts of western states generally,
manifest a Congressional intent that the trust be maintained for con-
' ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIiq § 104 (1st ed. 1936).
' 3 NiCHOLS op. cit. supra note 28, at § 8.6205.
3' Arizona's brief presented a number of studies which purported to demonstrate
that the increased valuation of adjacent and nearby lands could be measured with
accuracy. Brief of Respondent, p. 27, Lassen v. Arizona, 87 Sup. Ct. 584 (1967).
These studies, however, only demonstrated the ability to measure increases in land
valuation after construction and opening of a highway. The studies failed to provide
a definite measure of increased valuation to land for prospective highway construc-
tion. Thus it would appear that the Court was correct in holding the measure of
"prospective enhancement" to be too indefinite and conjectural a basis for a present
condemnation award.
I251 U.S. 41 (1919).
Id. at 47.
'This involves the necessary consequence of shifting the tax burden among a
state's citizens. Funds for highway construction are derived primarily from gasoline
taxation, while education is supported by property taxation. The result of treating
the school land trust as simply another state "pocket" would be to shift onto property
owners part of the tax burden of highway construction previously borne by highway
users.
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tinuing support of public education, safeguarded from infringement
by lesser interests." The Congressional mandate is effectuated and
the trust funds protected from diversion by the strict and unqualified
requirement of compensation at full appraised value. The Court's
decision allows maximum beneficial use by the state of trust lands,
while insuring that the high place Congress accorded to public educa-
tion in the hierarchy of competing public policies is not endangered.
MODIFICATION OF IRREVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUSTS
WITH REMAINDER INTEREST IN SETTLORS' HEIRS
Plaintiff executed a spendthrift trust reserving to herself an income
interest for life. Upon her death corpus was to be paid over as she ap-
pointed by will, or in default of appointment to "such of her next of
kin... as by the law in force in the District of Columbia at the death
of the... [settlor] shall be provided for in the distribution of an
intestate's personal property therein." The trust by its terms was
irrevocable, and there was no reserved power to alter, amend, or
modify. Settlor sought modification of the trust, invoking the doctrine
of worthier title in an attempt to construe the future interest as a re-
version in herself, rather than a remainder in her next of kin. As both
sole beneficiary and settlor, she claimed the power to revoke or modify
the trust at will. On appeal from summary judgment for defendant-
trustee, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
Held: The doctrine of worthier title is rejected in the District of
Columbia; therefore settlor-beneficiary cannot modify the trust with-
out consent of remaindermen; however, when a trust instrument cre-
ates a remainder interest in a settlor's heirs or next of kin, a guardian
ad litem representing unborn and unascertained heirs may bargain
with the settlor for trust modification and consent thereto on their
behalf.' Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).2
'The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act was introduced in the 61st Congress
as H.R. 18166. Definite concern was expressed that the state receive adequate return
from the disposition of the trust lands for support of public education. See H.R.
REP. No. 152, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). During the act's passage there were
substitutions and amendments to strengthen the trust provisions. See 45 CoNG. REc.
8487 (1910) ; S. REP. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1910). When the bill came
before the entire Senate, the chairman of the Senate Committee of Territories
stressed the importance of the trust provisions in providing continuing support of
public education. See Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 CONG. REc. 8227 (1910).
'The sole issue in the principal case was whether the court would apply the
doctrine of worthier title as a means of trust modification. Affirmance of the judg-
ment for the trustee was without prejudice to future modification attempts by settlor
based on the court's dicta.
216 CATHOLIC U.L. R v. 239; 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1552; 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 166; 51
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1228.
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